

SAFETY OBSERVATION REPORT

Observers: I. Ben-Zvi, R. Karol		Date: 6/19/08	Duration: 40 min.	Phenix IR, B1008		
Observation Categories	Observation Questions:					
POS	In risky position relative to task? Protection OK?		Exposed to risks of temperature/electricity/gas/chemicals/radiation?			
ERG	Risks from: posture, repetitive motion, load, vibration, temperature, lighting, noise, work flow?					
PPE	Correct PPE? All parts of the body properly protected?		In safe condition?			
T&E	Is tool, equipment or facility right for the job? Used correctly?		In safe condition?			
PRO	Is there a standard procedure? Followed?		Is procedure adequate?	Up to date?	Understood?	
ORD	Is workplace orderly? Is there a place for all materials and equipment?		Adequate space? All in its place?			
ASF	No unsafe acts or conditions identified					
Work Area or Location	Number of Contacts	Description of unsafe acts	Observation Category	Follow-up Action	Person Responsible	By Date
Building 1008 – Phenix IR	5	No unsafe acts observed. Positives: Work planning is used extensively and workers were very positive about the way the Phenix Work Control Manager handled work controls with daily briefings, input from workers, and good communications.	ASF			
Building 1008 – Phenix IR	1	Held detailed discussion on how workers viewed safety at C-AD facilities. See comment #1 below.	ASF	Review setup and configuration of Phenix lampshade setup on west side of IR and determine if this must be a confined space for the summer work.	Ray Karol	6/20/08 (completed)
Building 1008 – Phenix IR	1	Held detailed discussion on how workers viewed safety at C-AD facilities. See comment #2 below.	ASF	Have C-AD Health Physics RCT survey both side of the Phenix IR in the RHIC tunnel to see if area can be down posted.	Paul Bergh	6/27/08
COMMENT:						

1. The Phenix magnet lamp shades, when full of equipment are 2A confined spaces. Discussion with the worker noted that the lampshade area of the Phenix magnet was fully opened for the shutdown with scaffolding used. There is no difference with this area when compared to other areas around the detector that has scaffolding. He asked if this area could be re-evaluated as a confined space in the current configuration by C-AD ESSHQ Division. This would save many unnecessary hours of Confined Space training for students coming to BNL to work in this area on the scaffolding during the shutdown since none of the material in the confined space training course was related to hazards with this work in the open configuration. The next day on 6/20/08, The C-AD ESSHQ Division Head and the C-AD Work Control Coordinator reviewed this area with the Phenix Work Control Manager and agreed that the work being done on the scaffolding was not confined space work but work being done in the lower portion of the lampshade area was still in a confined space. This separation of work would be clearly described in a revised enhanced work permit to be completed by the Phenix Work Control manager and reviewed by C-AD ESSHQ Division. This item is closed.
2. The second issue was of the same type of issue in that the goal was to reduce unnecessary training. If the tunnel areas next to the Phenix IR could be de-posted as a Controlled Area, unnecessary training of student workers would be avoided. The ESSHQ Division Head agreed to have Health Physics re-survey these areas to see if de-posting was possible.

Note: Responding to these worker concerns and removing unnecessary controls without reducing safety helps the workers have respect for the safety program when they see safety requirements only used for real safety reasons and not because it appears easier to keep unjustified safety requirements in place.