

CONCURRENCE
OSMD PTC
CAROLAN/kg
08/07/95
OSMD PWD
DESMARAIS
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CRESCENZO
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AUG - 7 1995

Dr. M. S. Davis
 Associated Universities, Inc.
 Brookhaven National Laboratory
 Upton, New York 11973

Dear Dr. Davis :

SUBJECT: ACCELERATOR SAFETY ENVELOPES FOR ALTERNATING GRADIENT SYNCHROTRON (AGS) AND AGS TO RELATIVISTIC HEAVY ION COLLIDER (RHIC) TRANSFER LINE

Reference: Letter, M. Brooks to C. Nealy, Subject: Same as Above, Dated August 2, 1995

The Brookhaven Area Office (BHO) has reviewed the subject documentation submitted as attachments to the referenced letter, against the requirements of DOE Order 5480.25.

Accordingly, I approve the Accelerator Safety Envelope for the AGS, as applicable to AGS operation, and the Accelerator Safety Envelope for the AGS to RHIC (AtR) line, as applicable to AtR line commissioning. As required by DOE Order 5480.25, AGS and RHIC facilities shall confine activities within the limits prescribed by these Accelerator Safety Envelopes or otherwise stop any activity violating the Accelerator Safety Envelope and inform DOE.

If there are any questions concerning this matter, please contact Pepin Carolan of my staff, at ext. 5966.

Sincerely,

**ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
 FRANK CRESCENZO FOR**

Carson L. Nealy
 Area Manager

- cc: J. Dooling, ESHD, CH
- D. Lowenstein, BNL
- S. Ozaki, BNL
- E. Lessard, BNL
- S. Musolino, BNL
- W. R. Casey, BNL
- H. Kahnhauser, BNL

FILE CODE
5480.25



BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.

Upton, Long Island, New York 11973-5000

(516) 282-
FTS 666-

August 2, 1995

Dr. Carson Nealy
DOE Area Office
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, New York 11973-5000

SUBJECT: Accelerator Safety Envelopes for AGS and AGS to RHIC Transfer Line

REFERENCE: Letter, Nealy to Davis, Subject: Commissioning Plan for Fast Extracted Beam, V Line and AGS to RHIC, dated June 28, 1995

Dear Dr. Nealy,

The approval for the Commissioning Plan in the above reference did not include approval for Accelerator Safety Envelopes (ASEs) for the AGS and RHIC, which were included as attachments in the plan. The ASEs in the plan are superseded by the attached versions. I am submitting these ASEs to the BHO for separate review and approval in accordance with DOE Order 5480.25.

Yours truly,

Michael Brooks
Directors Office

MB/EL:dc

Copy to:

H. Kahnhauser
E. Lessard
D. Lowenstein
S. Musolino
S. Ozaki

Attachments:

AGS-OPM 2.5, "Operational Safety Limits/Accelerator Safety Envelope", July 21, 1995.
AGS-TPL 95.08, "Operational Safety Limits for Initial Commissioning of the AtR", July 17, 1995.



RECEIVED

Department of Energy

Brookhaven Area Office
P. O. Box 5000
Upton, New York 11973

CC Number: CC2003-2387
Director: Sheridan, T
Due: Rec'd: 5/21/2003
PDF File Name: CC2003-2387-ID.pdf
Concurrence: Not Required
Actionee
Actionee Due Date:

MAY 21 2003

MAY 20 2003

Deputy Director,
Operations

Mr. Thomas R. Sheridan
Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, N.Y. 11973

Dear Mr. Sheridan:

SUBJECT: MODIFICATION TO THE ALTERNATING GRADIENT SYNCHROTRON (AGS) ACCELERATOR SAFETY ENVELOPE (ASE) OPERATING SAFETY LIMIT (OSL) 4.0, FIRE PROTECTION

Reference: Letter from T. Sheridan, BNL, to M. Holland, BAO, Subject: "Modification to the Operating Safety Limit 4.0 of the AGS ASE", dated March 3, 2003.

The current DOE approved AGS ASE OSL 4.0 on fire protection (applicable to AGS, Booster and LINAC) could require the de-energizing of facility equipment should the installed fire detection and/or fire suppression system become partially or fully inoperable. Depending on the extent of inoperability, de-energizing certain facility equipment could lead to a facility shutdown. While the de-energizing of equipment reduces the risk of fire, other actions can be taken to reduce the fire risk without de-energizing equipment, thereby possibly preventing an unnecessary facility shutdown.

As requested, a review was performed on the proposed modification to the AGS ASE OSL 4.0. The proposed modification would authorize the Collider-Accelerator Department (C-AD) Chair or designee to allow continued operation of the AGS, Booster, and/or LINAC facilities for up to 80 consecutive hours with any partially or fully inoperable fire detection and/or fire suppression systems. When the fire detection and/or fire suppression systems are inoperable, suitable compensatory or interim actions would be taken to minimize the fire risk. These actions may include firewatches and other controls as described in your proposed OSL modification.

Based on our review, the proposed AGS ASE OSL 4.0 is approved contingent on the following:

- 1) Expedient corrective actions will be taken to return the inoperable fire detection and/or fire suppression system to an operable status to minimize the time of inoperability.
- 2) When fire detection and/or fire suppression systems are inoperable, the appropriate actions are taken as described in the BNL Environment, Safety and Health (ESH) Standard 4.0, Fire Protection.

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- 3) As soon as practicable, the BAO Facility Representative shall be informed following a C-AD decision allowing continued facility operation with an inoperable fire detection and/or fire suppression system (i.e., entering the AGS ASE OSL 4.0, Section V, Item 2a, Exception statement).

If you have any questions, please contact Peter Kelley of my staff at extension 5784.

Sincerely,



~~po~~ Michael D. Holland
Area Manager

cc: S. Mallette, BAO
D. Lowenstein, BNL
E. Lessard, BNL
R. Karol, BNL
J. Levesque, BNL